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Bad Science

COVER
STORY

EPA’s industry critics urge Congress and the new administrator to upgrade
the science used in regulatory decisionmaking. They are right that science at
the agency needs improvement — largely because these same self-interested
critics overwhelmingly dominate research agendas and peer review
LINDA GREER and RENA STEINZOR
“The right to search for truth implies also a duty:
one must not conceal any part of what one has
recognized to be true.” —ALBERT EINSTEIN

I

n Washington circles, “sound science”
has become the remedy of choice for
most of what ails the regulatory
system. Whether it’s arsenic in
drinking water or particulates in the air,
proponents of this seemingly simple solution
argue that if the Environmental Protection
Agency would only get more scientists on
board and listen carefully to their sage advice, we could eliminate or at least reduce
those excessive health and safety regulations
that squander public funds, freeing scarce resources to address far more urgent problems.
EPA indeed practices a great deal of “bad
science,” but not in the sense asserted by its
industry critics. What really upsets regulated
industry is not the agency’s supposed failure to consider “good science.” Instead, the
business community is driven to distraction
by the fact that EPA must make most decisions on the basis of incomplete or uncertain
science. However, as we explain below, Congress and EPA administrators have long recognized that the agency must act in the face
of uncertainty to achieve its mission. While
it is important to debate the issue of how to
operate in the face of scientific uncertainty, it
is unhealthy to allow that debate to obscure
far more profound and troubling problems
with scientific practice at EPA.
Although agency scientists do many tasks,
one of their most important responsibilities
is to select the salient developments among
various research methodologies and findings. It is critical that they perform this function with objectivity. If their analyses are infected with bias, their scientific practice, by
definition, is unsound. Unfortunately, bias
and secrecy increasingly compromise not
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only the work of EPA’s in-house scientists,
but also the ultimate failsafe intended to
guarantee the soundness of agency science:
peer review by the ostensibly independent
and objective Science Advisory Board.
EPA science is dominated by self-interested industry research and peer reviewed
by self-interested industry experts. The impact of these influences on the agency’s rules
is magnified by a lack of transparency about
what pieces of research were used as the basis for important policy conclusions and why
others were rejected. These problems are
compounded by the fact that “science” at the
agency is increasingly thrust into the role of
final arbiter of all decisionmaking. Science
cannot serve this purpose because the evidence on most issues considered by EPA is
not definitive.
Two case studies support our diagnosis
and suggest prescriptions for a cure. The first
involves the inexplicable decision by EPA’s
Office of Research and Development (the
primary location of in-house research and
analysis) to revisit the toxicity profile of vinyl chloride and downgrade its estimate of
the chemical’s carcinogenic effects. The second involves a misguided opinion issued by
the Science Advisory Board challenging an
EPA staff conclusion that dioxin is significantly more toxic than first supposed. In both
cases, experts working for chemical manufacturers dominated the process, managing
to manipulate the pace, content, and final
outcome of those deliberations.
At this point, readers may well wonder
why, if the state of EPA science is as bad as
we say it is, we don’t agree with the critics
who call for “sound science” — or “more science” or “better science, ” etc. Many reputable people, including several generations
of EPA administrators, have recommended
the expansion and elevation of science within
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Water Act requires the EPA administrator to
the agency, arguing that it is the crucial, missregulate contaminants that “may have an
ing element of wise decisionmaking. In fact,
adverse effect on the health of persons”
this spring Congress may consider a bill by
where “there is a substantial likelihood” that
Representative Vernon Ehlers (R-Michigan)
the contaminant will be “of public concern”
that would establish a deputy administrator
and present “a meaningful opportunity for
for science, to centralize administration and
health risk reduction.” The Clean Water Act’s
evaluation of the agency’s research. (See “A
central purpose is to “restore and maintain
View from the Hill,” page 30.) But, as we inthe chemical, physical, and biological integdicate at the top of this article, the call for
rity of the nation’s waters,” a phrase that has
sound science collapses two separate issues
no defined meaning in science and requires
into one.
human judgment.
The first of these issues is the appropriate
As recently as last year, in American Truckrole of science in EPA decisionmaking:
ing Associations v. Whitman, a unanimous deshould scientific evidence serve as the sole
cision authored by no less a regulatory skepdeterminant — or gate-keeper — of agency
tic than Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme
decisions whether to regulate? The second
Court reaffirmed Congress’s Clean Air Act
issue concerns the fundamentals of what we
mandate that EPA protect public health with
would call “sound” science: when EPA evaluan adequate margin of safety and without
ates available technical information, what
regard to costs. Recognizing
core principles must govern
that this and similar manits deliberations to ensure
dates mean acting in the
scientifically valid results?
face of scientific uncertainty,
An explication of where we
EPA mismanages
Governor Christine Todd
stand on the first issue will
Whitman told the National
make it clearer why we are
the
scientific
Academy of Sciences in a
so concerned about the secspeech delivered in 2000:
ond.
function to the
“The absence of certainty is
not an excuse to do nothing.
point
that
it
can
. . . Environmental policy
he unavoidable
should always be based on
reality is that, deno longer be
the soundest information
spite widespread
available at the time.” The
demands that
relied
upon
Earth Summit’s action plan,
EPA
employ
Agenda 21, used similar
more science, the scientific
to be either
language, admonishing all
information available to the
signatories (including the
agency rarely gives definiobjective
or
fair
United States): “Where
tive answers to the difficult
there are threats of serious
questions that confront it.
or irreversible damage, lack
Toxicology, epidemiology,
of full scientific certainty
conservation biology, ecolshall not be used as a reason for postponing
ogy — these and related fields have yet to
cost-effective measures to prevent environproduce research results that map a straightmental degradation.” Under all these formuforward path to uncontroversial policy solations, the crucial challenge is to ensure that
lutions. In many, if not most, cases EPA faces
the available science is factually correct and
the conundrum of implementing environappropriately interpreted, and is then
mental statutes that command it to protect
weighed with other factors in making final
public health and the environment from risks
decisions.
that are unknowable, understudied, or
Consider EPA’s efforts to reduce cancers
poorly understood from a scientific perspeccaused by exposure to toxic chemicals. Detive.
spite decades of research, cancer remains a
Congress appreciated this problem when
mysterious disease. Because we do not unit passed the statutes that define EPA’s misderstand how it is triggered in the body, no
sion. Look at the language of the basic laws
scientist can tell how many people will sufthat protect the air we breathe and the water
fer cancer following exposure to a given level
we drink. The Clean Air Act commands the
of a suspected carcinogen. Given these and
agency to protect public health with an “adother gaps in our understanding of the toxiequate margin of safety.” The Safe Drinking
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Both Sides Are Right: EPA Needs To Improve Science Function

T

sioned by Congress and EPA have
he public discourse over how
concluded that there are significant
Environmental Protection
problems with how science is used
Agency decisionmakers use
within the agency’s decisionmaking
science when determining controverstructure. It is worth noting that these
sial regulatory action or inaction alstudies, for the most part, did not
ways seems to fall into two camps.
quarrel over the quality of the scienOne view comes from the regulated
tific research at EPA, but how it is
community, who claim a controverused as proposed regulations move
sial decision ignores the underlying
through the agency’s bureaucracy.
science, which, in their view, shows
In 2000, the National Academy of
the decision does more harm than
Sciences concluded a series of
good. Another view
four reports collectively titled
comes from environStrengthening Science at the U.S.
mental and public adEnvironmental Protection Agenvocacy
communicy. The NAS reviewed how scities, who claim that the
ence was conducted at EPA
agency ignores the unand incorporated into the
derlying science while
regulatory decisionmaking
letting the regulated
process. The report concluded
community unduly influence the process. Rep. Vernon Ehlers that while the use of sound science is one of the agency’s
While these constituenavowed major goals, both intramucies may forever diverge on the merral and extramural science should be
its and effectiveness of a controvermore fully integrated into its mansial decision, one theme is common
agement and decisionmaking structo both camps — that science does
ture.
not adequately imbue the regulatory
The NAS concluded with this imdecisionmaking process at the EPA.
portant statement: “The importance
The next stop for this debate is
of science in EPA decisionmaking
usually the halls of Congress and the
process should be no less than that
judiciary, where these decisions are
afforded to legal considerations. Just
thoroughly scrutinized. Time and
as the advice of the agency’s general
again I have heard my colleagues
counsel is relied upon by the adminsay, “What I really want is the use
istrator to determine whether a proof sound science at the EPA.” Time
posed action is legal, an appropriand again I have seen court decisions
ately qualified and adequately emoverturn a regulation because it did
powered scientific official is needed
not have a proper scientific foundato attest to the administrator and the
tion. That science is not infused
nation that the proposed action is scithroughout EPA’s regulatory proentific.”
cess becomes a credible argument to
In a 1998 science policy report, apwage both just and unjust legislative
proved by the House Science Comand legal battles over EPA action or
mittee and the full House, titled Uninaction. Members of Congress and
locking our Future: Toward a New Nathe judiciary do not have confidence
tional Science Policy Study, I had
that the agency uses science approreached similar conclusions about the
priately in its decisions. Science
use of science in decisionmaking —
should not be used as a cudgel to
that science should not be used as a
win a battle, or as an afterthought
mere adjunct to the regulatory systo the regulatory process; rather it
tem; rather, it should be used at the
should serve as a decision’s foundabeginning, middle, and end of an
tion.
agency’s decisionmaking process —
Congressional and judicial doubt
and about its proper place in an
about EPA’s process is borne out of
agency’s bureaucracy.
both right and wrong motivations.
I introduced H.R. 64, The StrengthHowever, it is not unfounded. Sevening Science at the Environmental
eral independent reviews commis-
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Protection Agency Act, to capture the
two primary recommendations of the
NAS report and meet the goal I laid
out in the science policy report. First,
the legislation would establish a new
Deputy Administrator for Science
and Technology to serve as an advocate for and reviewer of science at the
most senior levels of the agency. Second, the legislation would convert
the position of the Assistant Administrator of the Office of Research and
Development to a set term and give
that position the title of the agency’s
Chief Scientist.
The Deputy Administrator position will bring a much needed change
to the culture of the EPA and ensure
that science has a higher profile in the
agency’s decisionmaking process.
This person would not only be accountable to the administrator for
improving and overseeing science at
the agency, but would also be accountable to Congress. This relationship would bolster Congress’s confidence in the appropriate role of science at EPA, and therefore in regulatory decisions.
The Deputy Administrator is also
needed to coordinate research between the regulatory and scientific
arms of the agency. A common problem with trying to ensure that science is involved throughout the
regulatory process is that the head
of the scientific arm of the agency,
the Assistant Administrator for
ORD, shares the same rank as the
heads of the regulatory offices. The
authors of the NAS report argued
that since the new Deputy would
rank higher than the existing AAs,
this person could foster research relationships between ORD and the
regulatory offices.
Furthermore, the Deputy Administrator could develop and oversee an
agency-wide inventory of scientific
activities. Various efforts to do this inventory have all died after fits and
starts because there is no central science policy authority to administer
this work. The Deputy Administrator would have the appropriate authority to ensure that the best possible peer-review and research-plan-
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ning practices are used for all of the agency’s
scientific endeavors.
While the first recommendation of the legislation and the academy report is intended
to increase the political clout that science has
at the agency, the second recommendation,
to establish a set term for the AA of ORD,
seeks to decrease political pressures on this
office. The report notes, “Although the political aspect of the Assistant Administrator’s
job often receives considerable attention, the
most important aspects of the job are not political.” Since the Deputy Administrator
could bear many of the political pressures
inside the agency, the AA for ORD could refocus on his or her role as the agency’s Chief
Scientist and running a world-class scientific
organization.
The tenure of an AA for ORD averages
two to three years and is typically a lower
priority appointment in new administrations. Under the current political appointment model, this position changes at least
as often as the administration changes. The
NAS noted that frequently changing goals,
priorities, practices, structure, or funding are
particularly disruptive to research organizations because of the long-term nature of research activities. Research endeavors cannot
be easily stopped and then started again
without significantly hurting productivity. A
longer tenure for the AA would help insulate the office during changes in the administration, thereby providing more continuity for research conducted at the agency.
The NAS report captured the challenge
that EPA’s science mission faces in the future and the need to strengthen science at
the agency by saying, “In the three decades
since the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency was created, great progress has
been achieved in cleaning the nation’s worst
and most obvious environmental pollution
problems. Belching smokestacks and rawsewage discharges are now scarce, and air
pollution alerts and beach closings are more
rare. EPA deserves a significant share of the
credit for the accomplishments, but some
of the most difficult and challenging tasks
remain. Many past illusions about simple
and easy solutions to environmental problems have been replaced by greater realization that environmental protection is a complicated and challenging mission.” It is time
that Congress and EPA rise up to meet this
challenge by passing and implementing the
provisions of H.R. 64.
Vernon Elhers (R-Michigan) is Chairman of
the House Science Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards.

cology of common chemicals, EPA must act
in advance of definitive scientific evidence
in order to fulfill its statutory mandate to protect human health. If scientific evidence is
called upon to resolve policy disputes where
definitive answers are unavailable, science
will lose the unique value it has to
policymakers, converting the interpretations
of scientific findings into an exercise in advocacy rather than an ongoing quest for
truth.
Since such a broad and authoritative range
of policymakers, over the course of several
decades, have recognized that scientific uncertainty is inevitable, why is it so difficult
to resolve the equally inevitable question of
how much uncertainty is too much? Recent
developments suggest that regulated industries use routine scientific data gaps opportunistically, by insisting that until EPA has
“better science,” it should not act. The infamous case of how much arsenic should be
allowed in drinking water illustrates this
phenomenon perfectly. In 1996, a unanimous
Congress told EPA to change the 50-year-old
standard that scientists conceded was not adequate to protect public health. The agency’s
in-house scientists worked diligently over a
period of several years, supplemented with
expert panels convened by the National
Academy of Sciences. EPA conducted an exhaustive rulemaking that gave affected constituencies ample time to submit information.
Cumulatively, the research demonstrated
that EPA should lower the standard dramatically to avoid unacceptable adverse health
effects, although the scientists could not reach
a consensus on the appropriate numerical
level. As is usually the case, there was no science that indicated precisely when exposure
levels stop being “safe.”
Operating competently in the face of remaining uncertainties, EPA Administrator
Carol Browner was close to making a new
standard final late in the Clinton administration when congressional appropriators invoked the specter of incomplete — and therefore “bad” — science in order to delay promulgation of the rule into the new administration. Browner nonetheless published the
standard as final right before George W. Bush
took office as president. Then, as the appropriators and their allies, mining interests and
drinking water system operators in the West,
had hoped, Whitman moved to delay the
rule’s effective date, declaring that she
wanted to review the adequacy of the underlying science. Subsequently confronted
J A N U A R Y / F E B R U A R Y
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rules of the discipline. Too often, EPA deems
with consistent support from NAS experts for
scientific evidence supporting more rigorous
an even tougher standard, Whitman ultistandards to be marginal and more readily
mately was forced to reverse her decision and
accepts research suggesting that standards
allow the promulgated standard to go into
can be loosened. We begin with a review of
effect. The arsenic episode is a powerful exthe principles that define truly sound science
ample of how, even when the National Acadand then apply those standards to the recent
emy of Sciences concludes that there is suffivinyl chloride and dioxin reassessments.
cient basis to lower allowed exposures to a
toxic chemical, enough is never enough for
those whose true intent is to hold back government intervention to protect public health.
cience enjoys a unique reputation
as an objective and dispassionate
Scientists are comfortable with data gaps
and uncertainties. They view them not as
human endeavor. Because we con“problems” but as future research agendas.
sider it to be inherently unbiased,
science is accorded a privileged role
It is policymakers who are plagued by these
in deliberations about the organization of hurealities because they must make decisions
in the face of uncertainty or stop trying to
man affairs. Unlike many other human endeavors, scientists preserve the integrity of
protect public health until some indefinite,
the scientific process exclusively through selffar-off day. As the arsenic example reveals,
the call for “more science” heard in the halls
regulation. Although there are isolated exof Congress and from regulated industries ofamples of outside, lay investigations chalten serves as nothing more than a ruse for
lenging the credibility of scientific research,
indefinite delay on a rule, sometimes for dethe repetition of experiments by fellow scicades. Given the political muscle of those
entists and objective peer review are the rouwho have mounted this campaign, scientists
tine methods for uncovering mistakes and aswatching these developsessing when progress in
ments from the sidelines
understanding a topic has
would do well to take note:
been made.
the fruitless quests for more
For centuries, scientists
Congress and EPA have engaged in their
and more definitive evidence from environmental
search for the truth by ciradministrators
policymakers unwilling to
culating the results of origisuffer political consequences
nal research among their
have
long
for restricting pollution will
colleagues, first for informal
inevitably make scientists
discussion and then for forrecognized that,
the whipping boys for the
mal, outside peer review.
as required by its
consequences of regulatory
Colleagues first repeat
gridlock. Unless we recogwork accomplished by othcore statutes, the
nize that “science” cannot
ers and then extend the exdetermine all that EPA is reperiments into additional
agency must act
quired by law to do, the
areas. By exposing all of the
in the face of
agency will never have the
underlying elements of
breathing room it needs to
one’s work to inspection by
uncertainty to
craft wise policy.
dispassionate peers, and reAs important as the issue
vealing details sufficient to
achieve its
of what role science can and
replicate results, researchers
should play at EPA is the isbuild on others’ successes
mission
sue of the fundamental prinand avoid others’ failures.
ciples that should govern the
The transparency of reagency’s on-going scientific
sults and the impartiality of
deliberations. In this longconclusions derived from
overlooked area, we have found problems
those results are the indispensable foundathat would shock most traditional, academic
tion of science. Peer review and replication
scientists. The remainder of this article is deare the only reliable methods to ensure that
voted to demonstrating our case that too
experiments are conducted in a scientifically
much of the science used by EPA is intrinsiappropriate manner and that the results and
cally unsound, straying far from the princonclusions presented by the researchers are
ciples that have long served as the ground
supportable by the data generated. The peer-
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chemical and like the way the results came
review process is often challenging and difout. Only producers of an arguably safer alficult. But without it, results and conclusions
ternative have an economic incentive to seccannot be accepted as valid.
ond-guess, and they would likely place a
The public trust in science depends on its
higher priority on testing their own comunique reputation for objectivity. Scientists
pounds.
are expected to have opinions, but are also
For better or worse, these economic incenexpected to resist bias. They are expected to
tives mean that the government must play
reach careful conclusions and limit their conan active, rigorous role in reviewing and chalclusions to those supported by data. Or, to
lenging scientific research developed by selfput this central principle more crassly, a
interested private parties. The National Acadscientist’s quest for the truth and expression
emy of Sciences, the National Institutes of
of opinion at the end of the quest should not
Health, and the Centers for
be for sale or subject to conDisease Control, to name
trol by self-interested sponjust a few, have erected insors, supervisors, the governfrastructures of in-house
ment, or any other entity with
scientists and external
control over the scientist’s caIf scientific
peer-review panels to unreer. Once financial considerdertake these functions.
ations and legal constraints
evidence is called
Unfortunately, these outinterfere with a quest for sciside institutions have limentific truth, the public trust
upon to resolve
ited resources and too
is broken, and science loses its
policy disputes
rarely are able to double
power and authority.
check EPA’s work.
Unfortunately, funding for
where definitive
Science at EPA supports
the replication of experimendecisionmaking
through
tal results and peer review of
answers are
two main activities. Inscientific research is most
unavailable,
house scientists assigned
abundant in the context of
to the Office of Research
topics that have captured
science will lose
and Development analyze
public attention or, to put it
the outside studies that are
another way, where the rethe unique value
relevant to the issues at
sults of the research are of
stake. They maintain the
widespread economic or soit has to
Integrated Risk Informacial importance. Claims that
policymakers
tion System, or IRIS, an ina scientific team had created
ternationally influential
cold fusion were immediately
compendium of “toxicodissected because of the pological profiles” that detentially monumental impliscribe the characteristics of
cations of such a discovery on
specific chemicals and set quantitative levels
the world’s need for safer and cheaper enfor safe exposures to them. Our case studies
ergy. Similarly, discovery of a wonder drug
involve reassessments of long-standing toxito treat such widespread ailments as diabecological profiles. The second activity is peer
tes or stroke would inspire careful and exreview, performed by panels of outside extensive inspection — by the discoverer ’s
perts convened by the EPA Science Advisory
competitors, potential allies, the larger mediBoard and several other, smaller boards, such
cal community, and the government.
as the Science Advisory Panel, which focuses
In a modern world overwhelmed by inon pesticides. The SAB receives inquiries
formation and disinformation, extensive peer
from agency staff working on regulatory isreview or replication of certain other types
sues and responds with advice based on its
of scientific findings is difficult to instigate,
assessments of relevant scientific research.
especially in the private sector. So, for exOur dioxin case study concerns an SAB peer
ample, efforts by a chemical manufacturer to
review.
prove that a given substance is not as toxic
Many of EPA’s in-house scientists and SAB
as EPA had originally assumed are unlikely
experts serve the agency and the public with
to be scrutinized, much less validated, by
distinction, laboring diligently to produce
other private sector scientists. Competitors
informative and dispassionate science to
have a low interest in refuting such results
guide policymaking. Too often, however,
because they typically manufacture the same
J A N U A R Y / F E B R U A R Y
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both enterprises flout the fundamental preprint diseases.” Vinyl chloride, a volatile incepts of scientific research: first, the disclosure
dustrial chemical used since the 1930s to
make plastics, is notorious for causing a rare
of methods, data, and calculations sufficient
for appropriate experts to review the work or
and serious tumor, angiosarcoma of the liver,
evaluate whether the conclusions reached
primarily among workers manufacturing
and handling the compound. Studies have
were adequately supported by the study’s
findings and, second, conducting peer-review
also linked vinyl chloride to a number of
that is free of conflicts of interest.
other cancers, including brain cancer.
In 1975, following a series of animal and
Even a cursory look at the science EPA has
epidemiological studies demonstrating the
practiced over the past decade shows that it
has strayed far from the mandates of transchemical’s hazards, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration used the evidence
parency and impartiality. Much of the science
on liver cancer as the basis for tough regulathat EPA uses as a basis for decisions with
tions limiting workplace exposure. These
far-reaching implications for public health is
regulations resulted in sharp reductions in
not peer-reviewed, and it is often based on
the prevalence of the chemical in the workconfidential information or analysis. As a replace and, as a result, the environment.
sult, it would not be considered credible by
So it was a surprise when, in May 2000, EPA
disinterested researchers.
completed a 20-fold downgrading of the toxiAt the root of this crisis in credibility is the
cological profile for vinyl chloride. EPA’s decidominance of industry funding as the source
sion to review vinyl
of support for environmental
chloride’s toxicity was espehealth research. The vast macially startling because the
jority of research on the toxiOSHA regulations, among
cological properties of comVinyl chloride is
other factors, have had their
mon chemicals occurs outdesired effect. At the same
side of the government (or
notorious for
time that worker exposures
sometimes in other agencies).
have plummeted in the last
EPA’s toxicological profiles
causing liver
decade and public exposure
are based on this outside
to the chemical has been
work. Corporate sponsorcancer among
minimal, industry has been
ship does not, in and of itself,
workers handling able to continue using it, prorender such research invalid.
ducing such goods as upholBut it does unquestionably
it. Studies have
stery and waterpipes from its
put industry in the driver’s
polymerized form. Given the
seat for both the pace and foalso linked vinyl
demonstrated benefits of the
cus of data development to
regulations to both workers
support EPA rulemaking.
chloride to a
More insidiously, it also puts
and industry, and the greatly
number of other
lowered risk to the public, viindustry in charge of decidchloride should be off the
ing what information it
cancers, including nyl
would like to disclose and
list of chemicals requiring
what analyses it would like
toxicological review, leaving
brain cancer
the agency free to pursue
to do, presenting ample opportunities for industrymore prevalent, less underfunded researchers to keep
stood chemicals.
underlying data and discrepThe decision to revisit the
ancies confidential and to make strategic dewell-trodden ground of vinyl chloride toxiccisions as to whether to submit research studity appears especially irrational because EPA
ies for EPA’s consideration.
has faced extensive criticism for failing to assess the toxicity of many other chemicals produced and used in large amounts annually.
EPA has no toxicity information on 43 peror several decades, the scientific
cent of the nearly 3,000 organic chemicals
community has achieved a rare
produced or imported in amounts above one
consensus that three substances —
million pounds annually, and a full set of balead, asbestos, and vinyl chloride
sic toxicity information is available for only
— are not just extraordinarily toxic
7 percent. Toxicological studies of these
but produce well-characterized consequences
chemicals should be its overriding priority.
of exposure, known colloquially as “finger-
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workers have generally reported the occurFurther, little new technical information
rence of many cancers besides liver angiosaon vinyl chloride’s toxicity has become availrcomas, including cancer in the lung, lymable since the agency’s last review of the
phatic and blood tissue, and the brain, with
chemical, in 1994. Instead, EPA staff based
the last of particular concern. Richard
the reassessment on animal studies comMonson first found an excess of brain canpleted in 1991 and earlier. Only one unpubcers in his study of Swedish workers in 1974,
lished epidemiological study update was
as did Irving Tabershaw and William Gaffey
new, and it reached conclusions similar to
in 1974 and Richard Waxweiler in 1976. In
previous analyses.
1981, W. Clark Cooper enlarged the
Although no changes in existing regulaTabershaw and Gaffey study and found stations were made when EPA made its decitistically significant increases in brain and
sion, the revised characterization of the hazcentral nervous system
ards posed by vinyl chloride
malignancies. In a 1991
exposure will prove very
update of the Cooper
valuable to manufacturers of
study, Otto Wong conthe chemical now engaged in
firmed statistically signifitoxic tort litigation with
OSHA regulation
cant brain cancers. The eviworkers who contracted
dence concerning brain
brain cancer following expoof vinyl chloride
cancers is sufficiently consure on the job, as well as
vincing that in 1989 the Vicompanies still facing liabilhas worked. So it
nyl Institute, an industryity at Superfund sites conwas a surprise
funded advocacy group,
taminated by the chemical.
acknowledged brain tu(Vinyl chloride has been
when, in May
mors as a valid concern in
found at one-third of the sites
a letter to the California
on the National Priorities
2000, EPA
Air Resources Board: “For
List.) The decision will have
completed a 20brain cancer, three out of
these effects because EPA’s
five studies demonstrate
toxicological profiles play the
fold downgrading statistically significant
crucial role of informing regufindings, although the relatory and judicial decisions
of the chemical’s
sults were somewhat vari— not just domestically but
able. Positive findings ocinternationally. Regretfully,
toxicological
curred in studies with the
given the potential implicaprofile
greatest statistical power.”
tions of this change, the deWritten correspondence
tails of EPA’s reevaluation of
included in the EPA docket
the science reveal biased techon vinyl chloride reveals
nical judgment that resulted
that the Chemical Manuin poor selection of evidence
facturers Association, the trade association
practices and disproportionate reliance on inthat recently was renamed the American
formation generated by self-interested parChemistry Council, became quite upset with
ties.
Wong for publishing his positive results on
EPA made two fundamentally flawed debrain tumors without first submitting the
cisions in justifying the downgrade. First, the
study to its scientists for review. Wong did
agency decided to confine its reassessment
the work under a research contract with CMA
to statistically significant liver tumors, ignorthat apparently included a “prior review”
ing the various other cancers that frequently
clause giving it the right to comment before
appear in both animal and epidemiological
publication.
reports. Second, although the reassessment
In what was likely a response to the trouble
continued to rely on animal data, EPA dethat the Wong update caused industrial uscided to abandon certain default “safety facers of vinyl chloride, CMA commissioned yet
tors” it has historically used when applying
another study of the same worker cohort, upanimal data to humans. Instead, the agency
dating some data post-Wong but also re-anarelied on a newly developed, “pharmacokilyzing some of Wong’s data in a way that
netic” model designed to predict an internal
raised questions about his conclusions. This
concentration of vinyl chloride in the human
study was never published in a peer-rebody.
viewed journal, but it was submitted to EPA
Epidemiological studies of vinyl chloride
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and became a primary basis for its 2000 rePA’s second technical misstep was
assessment.
the decision to abandon the conIn justifying its decision to focus excluventional approach used to apply
sively on liver cancer in recalculating the vianimal data to likely human health
nyl chloride potency factor, EPA cites this uneffects. When scientists conduct
published work, as well as two peer-reanimal studies, they expose the animals to
viewed research review articles. The unpubincreasing doses of a chemical, and then perlished CMA study was not, by itself, a suffiform an autopsy on the animal to see how
cient basis for EPA to eliminate brain cancers
many tumors were generated at each dose.
from its list of concerns. To the contrary, this
Because chemicals may take a different
study also reported statistically significant incourse within the bodies of rats, mice, and
cidences of brain cancers.
other creatures than they do in the human
As for the two articles reviewing availbody, and may be metabolized at different
able research (as opposed to reporting the
rates, animal studies using traditional dose
results of original research), the first was
measurements can either overstate or underwritten by Sir Richard Doll in 1988, two
state the consequences of comparable human
years before the publication of the Wong
exposures. Up until recently, the best way to
study. Without the benefit of the Wong or
eliminate such uncertainties would be — hysubsequent epidemiological updates of vipothetically, that is — to intentionally expose
nyl chloride workers, Doll had raised quespeople to different amounts of a chemical and
tions about the strength of the data supportthen track the “fate and transport” of the
ing brain tumors, but had concluded with
chemicals within their bodies by drawing
the relatively mild statement: “There is too
samples, taking biopsies of organs, etc. Such
little evidence either to constudies should be unthinkfirm or refute the suggesable for obvious reasons.
tion that vinyl chloride
Pharmacokinetic models
might cause melanoma or
are an emerging, as yet excancers of the thyroid,
perimental, alternative
In justifying its
brain, and lymphatic and
method designed to bridge
downgrade of
hematopoietic systems.”
this gap. Such models estiThis equivocal conclusion
mate internal concentravinyl chloride,
from an outdated paper
tions within the human
hardly provided a reliable
body by using a computer
EPA cites an
basis for ignoring the nuprogram to predict how fast
unpublished
merous studies in EPA’s dethe chemical is absorbed in
cisionmaking docket that
the bloodstream, whether it
review and two
found statistically signifireaches the brain, etc. The
cant incidences of brain tumodels then derive an “efreviews of
mors. Indeed, Doll has caufective” dose for a given ortioned against using epidegan over the time that the
technical
miological results to dishuman body metabolizes
literature, one
miss chemical hazards in
the chemical. If doses of vithis and other publications.
nyl chloride at X levels
outdated, the
The other cited research
caused Y incidences of tureview article was authored
mors in rats, but pharmacoother
irrelevant
by Jan Storm and Karl
kinetic models show that
Rozman in 1997, but it does
humans metabolize the
not address the issue of brain
chemical more effectively
or other tumors caused by
than rats, and therefore exvinyl chloride exposure. Rather, the paper
perience lower internal concentrations, the
compares various risk assessment extrapomodel provides support for downgrading eslation models used and proposed by EPA.
timates of the chemical’s carcinogenic effects
Given the weakness of Doll’s conclusion, and
on people.
the inappropriateness of the Storm and
The catch here is that pharmacokinetic
Rozman citation, EPA is left without evidence
models are at the cutting edge of the already
to support its decision to limit its reassesshighly uncertain science of environmental
ment of vinyl chloride’s carcinogenicity only
modeling as a whole. It is certainly true that
to tumors of the liver.
reputable scientists are working to refine
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policy choice as a basis for the reevaluation
such models in order to better predict effects
of vinyl chloride toxicity. Furthermore, the
of exposure. It is also likely that, once they
Clewell model was confined to liver tumors,
are developed, such models should allow us
ignoring all the other tumors of concern. Usto better understand the correlation between
ing such a limited model to justify dropping
internal concentrations of toxic compounds
safety factors for cancers other than liver canand adverse health effects. But at this point
cer added insult to injury.
in the evolution of scientific understanding,
The fatal blow to the technical credibility
these models cannot be validated with reof EPA’s vinyl chloride decision is that inspect to exposures at environmentally realdustry scientists drafted the final decisionistic concentrations. This uncertainty means
making document. The revised toxicological
that pharmacokinetic modeling unquestionprofile, known formally as
ably does not put EPA in a pothe 2001 Vinyl Chloride
sition to remove default
Toxicological Review, is
safety factors.
known in the world of sciMindful of these concerns,
ence as a “technical review
when EPA staff considered
The agency
paper,” consisting of a litthe application of pharmacoerature collection, analykinetic models in a proposed
removed default
sis, and interpretation. Vireassessment of the toxiconyl chloride is but the first
logical profile of trichloroetsafety factors in
of four chemicals where
hylene, they made a conapplying animal
industry is drafting the recerted effort to compare sev(The others are styeral versions of the models, as
data by relying on view.
rene, ethylene oxide, and
well as to quantify the level
toxaphene.)
of uncertainties in each
an unproven
In the scientific commodel’s estimates of liver,
computer program munity, it is widely underlung, and kidney tumors in
stood that technical reresponse to the modeled
designed to model views, like similar efforts
doses. This analysis quantiin other disciplines, are
fied uncertainties so huge (as
how a chemical
heavily influenced by an
high as 20,000-fold) that EPA
author’s subjective judgstaff insisted on continuing to
behaves in the
ment regarding such isapply default safety factors,
human body
sues as which studies to
thereby sharply curtailing
include, which studies to
their reliance on any of the
declare flawed or irrelmodels. This carefully qualievant, and which methodfied application of an emergologies to favor. The daning scientific methodology
ger of tainting a technical review with the unstands in stark contrast to the wholesale relirestrained bias of its author provoked the
ance on pharmacokinetic modeling results in
prestigious New England Journal of Medicine
the context of the vinyl chloride reassessment.
to prohibit “editorialists and authors of reSuch extraordinarily high rates of uncertainty
view articles” from having “any financial
raises obvious concerns about modeling acconnection with a company that benefits”
curacy, as well as concerns about “model
from the subject of the article. The Journal’s
shopping” by researchers trying to find a
decision was announced in a lengthy editomodel that gives a desired outcome rather
rial published in 1996 expressing mortificathan one that predicts outcomes accurately.
tion about its earlier publication of such a paThe general problems of pharmacokinetic
per authored by two industry experts with obmodels are severely compounded in the case
vious, but undisclosed, conflicts of interest.
of vinyl chloride by EPA’s decision to confine its consideration of modeling to a single
version developed by Harvey J. Clewell. The
Clewell model was not validated for expon theory, EPA’s Science Advisory Board
sures that occur routinely in the environment.
is where the buck stops on bad scienIt thus could not and was not validated for
tific practice within the agency, serving
its intended purpose — to accurately predict
as a safety net to protect against the
effects in humans. The inadequate verificatypes of abuses that run rampant when
tion of the Clewell model makes it a very poor
the generation of scientific evidence and the
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mastered the data before it recommended
selection of salient research are both detertightening the standard. In contrast, SAB panmined by industry. In reality, the SAB sufels too often make recommendations within
fers from many of the same weaknesses that
a period of a few months and with many
were manifest at the staff level in the vinyl
fewer world-renowned experts. Only after
chloride reassessment. Too often, the SAB opan additional NAS panel took the SAB panerates in a context where self-interested reelists to task for flaws in its analysis did the
search dominates the agenda of the outside
SAB panel back off its contention that EPA’s
experts recruited for peer review. The seriin-house scientists had erred. Although this
ousness of these problems is exacerbated
episode had a happy ending, the SAB arsenic
when studies important to EPA, such as those
toxicity panel was part of the problem, not
specifically delineating the potency of a certhe solution, of this contentious public health
tain carcinogen, have not been published in
debate.
a peer-reviewed journal and therefore were
never subject to an objective evaluation by a
disinterested party.
Last June, a General Accounting Office reut perhaps the best case study of
port evaluating the SAB review process
the weaknesses that increasingly
found that “to be effective, peer-review panoverwhelm the SAB is its particiels must be . . . free of any significant conflict
pation in the reassessment of
of interest and uncompromised by bias.” In
dioxin, which is released by incinthe report, “EPA’s Science Advisory Panels:
eration of chlorinated materials and also by
Improved Policies and Procedures Needed
paper bleaching. Starting in 1990, EPA staff
to Ensure Independence and Balance,” GAO
spent a decade pursuing claims that dioxin
auditors examined the procedures employed
was not as toxic as initially thought, producby SAB staff to ensure panel effectiveness.
ing a final report consisting of several thouGAO found that, despite the
sand pages that concluded
requirements of the Federal
the opposite: that dioxin is
Advisory Committee Act,
even more toxic than the
agency staff often failed to
agency’s original estimates.
After a decade
obtain conflict of interest disBut an SAB panel apclosures from candidates
pointed to peer review a
of research
and that EPA did not have
draft of the study coneither the information or
cluded in 2001 that in-house
pursuing
claims
processes in place that
scientists had exaggerated
would preclude the appointthe risks posed by exposure
that dioxin is not
ment of panelists with direct
to the chemical. These asseras toxic as
conflicts of interest. The retions not only challenged
sult of these omissions is the
the competence of the EPA
initially thought,
appointment of too many
staff who wrote the report,
panels disproportionately
they erected a barrier to its
agency staff
influenced by industry exrelease. During the public
concluded that the outcry that followed, it
perts motivated to clear
chemicals of prior findings
emerged that a large numchemical is in fact ber of panel members had
of toxicity. Many SAB panels escape this fate, but
worked for — or received
more toxic than
enough suffer from these
funding from — industries
ethical lapses to undermine
original estimates with a clear financial stake
the credibility of the entire
in the outcome of the delibEPA peer-review process.
erations.
One example of these
For example, John Graproblems is EPA’s starham, a political scientist apcrossed effort to strengthen public health
pointed to the panel, served as director of the
standards for arsenic in drinking water, menHarvard Center of Risk Analysis, which retioned earlier. An SAB review panel took on
ceives extensive funding from companies facno less an entity than the NAS arsenic panel.
ing liability for dioxin contamination of the
NAS experts typically spend two or more
environment. (Graham now serves as head
years reviewing available science on an isof the White House’s Office of Information
sue, and this particular panel had clearly
and Regulatory Affairs, which evaluates the
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on dioxin. For example, the panel had quescosts and benefits of rules before they are
tioned whether a “linear dose response
published as final. The Natural Resources
curve” for cancer was warranted because
Defense Council opposed his nomination.)
there is some evidence that dioxin is a proAppointment of a second panelist, Dennis
moter of the disease, rather than an initiator.
Paustenbach, was questioned for similar reaA linear dose response curve is a line that
sons. Research by the Center for Health and
runs all the way down to a dose of zero. It is
Environmental Justice found that fully a third
used when evidence is inconclusive as to
of the panel members received organizawhether there is a threshold dose below
tional support from 91 dioxin-producing
which exposure does not cause cancer. In the
companies. As a result, members of Congress
interest of safety, where
accused EPA of setting up a
data are inconclusive, a
panel dominated by industry
linear curve assumes that
bias. Witnesses at the public
any dose — no matter
hearing on the results of the
small — will lead to
SAB peer review repeated
The SAB attacked how
an adverse health effect.
these charges, questioning the
SAB panel argued
credibility and the integrity of
the staff report. It thatThe
exposure to dioxin exthe panel.
acerbates the growth of canYet the clear appearance —
said that dioxin
cerous cells that have aland likely existence — of imdoes not initiate
ready begun to grow in the
propriety is only a threshold
body as a result of another
conclusion that should
cancer but
cause, but does not itself iniprompt further investigation.
Regardless of the panelists’
promotes existing tiate the cancer. In other
words, there is a threshold,
links to self-interested induscancers. And it
the panel said, below which
tries, the crucial point is the
dioxin exposure is unimsoundness of the SAB’s assersaid that low
portant because some other
tion that EPA staff did not
factor is causing the disease.
consider alternative scientific
doses of dioxin
The panel further comtheories about dioxin’s toxicity and, as a result, overstated
might actually be plained that use of a nonlinear model would have
the degree of scientific cerbeneficial
resulted in a significant
tainty regarding the overall
downgrade of the chemtoxicity of the compound.
ical’s overall toxicological
Stung by these attacks, Willprofile because it would
iam Farland, the acting
have shown that small
deputy assistant administradoses of the chemical are not harmful. “Belief
tion in charge of the reassessment, took the
is one thing,” Farland responded, “data is anunusual step of entering the fray. In defendother.” EPA policy commands the use of a lining the agency’s work, Farland provided the
ear model when use of alternative models canSAB’s Executive Committee, which must
not be justified from the available data, as was
ratify all SAB panel reports, with nine pages
the case here. There were neither data nor
of blistering comments on the panel’s draft.
policy justifications to diverge from a linear
He said that the review contained “numerdefault model for dioxin’s cancer effects.
ous errors or distortions of fact” and that its
Similarly, Farland was incredulous that
major conclusions “defied logic.” He added
the SAB panel gave credence to the possibilthat the panel’s report was internally inconity that very low doses of dioxin were actusistent with the discussion of the science held
ally beneficial, resulting in decreases in canin open session at prior review meetings; was
cer rates. The panel had urged EPA to give
inconsistent with advice provided by SAB
this counter-intuitive possibility additional
panels on earlier versions of the reassessscrutiny. However, EPA’s extensive data
ment; and was inconsistent with EPA’s genshowed that dioxin could cause adverse
eral risk assessment procedures.
health effects at the relatively low levels that
Farland was particularly critical of the
already occur in the general population.
SAB’s review of the dioxin risk assessment
Farland pointed out that animal data are unmethodology, asserting that the panel had a
equivocal on this point and that human data,
poor understanding of both EPA guidance
though limited, are also compelling.
on risk assessment and the research available
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study to the New England Journal of Medicine. The article, accepted for publication following peer review by five outside experts,
explained that the finding of bioequivalence
meant U.S. health care costs could be cut by
$356 million annually if patients substituted
generic medications. The company immediately threatened to sue Dong, citing a provision in her research contract that required
her to obtain the company’s written consent
before publishing. The University of California began to waver in its support, and
Dong pulled the piece, triggering an intense
investigation by the publication.
The Journal finally published the article
in 1997, along with an article reporting that
s it crafts these policy and proin a survey of 2,100 life science researchers,
cedural guidelines for release
nearly 20 percent reported having delayed
later this year, the SAB will
the publication of research results for more
undoubtedly consider the
than six months. Of the 410 researchers willapproach taken by 12 medical
ing to report such delays, 28 percent said
journals that have faced equally serious
the reason was “to slow dissemination of
challenges to their reputations as sources of
undesired results.” A subsequent Carnegie
credible life science in the context of pharMellon University canvass of contracts at
macology, a discipline that is the genesis of
university-sponsored research centers
environmental toxicology. The crisis in the
found that 35 percent of
medical community started
signed agreements alsimmering in 1988 when the
lowed sponsors the right to
Boots Company, a British
delete information from
pharmaceutical manufacThe agency must
publication; 53 percent alturer, hired Betty Dong, a
reserve for its
lowed publication to be deresearcher at the University
and 30 percent alof California in San Franstaff the sensitive layed;
lowed both. To medical
cisco, to do a research study
journal editors, these troudesigned to demonstrate
task of writing
bling findings were the unthe superiority of the
toxicological
avoidable byproduct of
company’s bestselling thysharp increases in industry
roid medication, Synthroid,
profiles and
funding and increased
in comparison to generic
blending of business interversions. With Synthroid
should never
ests and science at both the
sales in the $600 million
individual researcher and
range in the United States
again delegate
university levels.
alone, Boots had a large
such work to selfWhat are the implicastake in demonstrating that
tions of this all-pervasive
generic versions are not
interested
industry funding of uni“bioequivalent,” and thereversity research? In a refore should not be substiindustry
cent article published in
tuted for its name brand. To
Risk Policy Report, David
Boots’s horror, the study
scientists
Clarke, a longtime obfound that the generics
server of the controversies
were in fact bioequivalent.
involved in toxic regulaThe company then spent
tion who now participates in the sound scifour years working to discredit the research,
ence debate on behalf of the American
raising a litany of technical objections to its
Chemistry Council, argued that the simple
protocols and their implementation. Despite
fact that a study is funded by industry does
this campaign, extensive investigation upnot mean that it is wrong, or even biased.
held the soundness of the study.
Regardless of whether you accept this
In 1994, in the midst of this maneuvercounter-intuitive argument that money does
ing, Dong submitted an article based on the
Ultimately, the controversy triggered by
the panel’s report on dioxin compelled the
SAB Executive Committee to substantially
rewrite the summary and conclusions of the
report, producing a credible outcome — but
illustrating the perils of lax ethical rules in
lower-profile proceedings. Recognizing that
this incident and the GAO report threatened
the credibility of the SAB itself, the Executive Committee agreed to set up a subcommittee that will recommend reform of SAB
policies and procedures on bias and conflict
of interest.
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tives at work in investigations of the toxiconot buy influence, it is certainly true that
logical properties of common chemicals. In
industry-sponsored research will remain the
too many cases, chemical manufacturers
primary source of information on toxics for
have powerful incentives not to know
the foreseeable future and that effective rewhether their products are toxic; ignorance
form must be premised on that fact.
may help them sidestep liability and inEmpirical studies have documented the
creased regulation. Unlike medicine, where
correlation between funding and results. For
publicizing efficacy is the quid pro quo for
instance, one analysis found that 98 percent
selling drugs, documenting the possible conof industry-funded research reported posisequences of chemical extively on the efficacy of speposure can only have a
cific drugs, versus 79 percent
negative impact on sales.
of independent research. BeIn fact, the only kind of
cause we cannot eliminate
EPA should
scientific inquiry with poour dependence on such retentially substantial finansearch, but suspect that fundestablish a peer
cial benefits is research
ing may affect the outcome,
that exonerates chemicals
all the other checks and balreview process
— such as the two exances — from disclosure of
that eliminates
amples featured in our
funding sources to peer recase studies.
view — become all the more
panelists with
As Wong’s experience
important.
with
the American ChemLast September, in reacactual or
istry Council shows, the
tion to stories and statistics
corporate funders of inlike these, the editors of the
potential
vestigations into chemical
world’s leading medical
conflicts of
toxicity, like the pharmajournals announced that they
ceutical companies, imwould no longer “review or
interest and
pose restrictive arrangepublish articles based on
ments on their grantees.
studies that are conducted
balances
Given the dearth of govunder conditions that allow
ernment funding for such
the sponsor to have sole concompeting
basic research, and the
trol of the data or to withhold
scientific views
fact that it is unlikely to
publication.” The editors
bring prestige to any truly
promised to release detailed
independent research inguidelines on this prohibistitution, these restriction, and on their intention to
tions are likely to persist in the absence of
require authors to disclose conflicts of instrong action by EPA and other regulatory
terest related to a study, in early 2002. “I am
agencies.
not against pharmaceutical companies,”
Catherine DeAngelis, editor of the Journal
of the American Medical Association, told the
Washington Post. “What I object to is the use
ix categories of reform are needed
of my journal as an advertisement mechato restore the credibility of science
nism rather than a vehicle for the distribuat EPA. First, the agency must fotion of sound medical science.”
cus on encouraging research that
The journals’ new policy is expected to
will close the gap in our underhave a profound effect on the way medical
standing of the toxicity of common chemiresearch is funded and conducted. The jourcals, rather than spending scarce resources
nals are crucial to the dissemination of pharon efforts to exonerate chemicals with a
maceutical research among the practicing
proven track record. Second, EPA must refuse
physicians who serve as purchasing agents
to consider, in any context, the results of refor all prescription drug sales. Television
search that does not satisfy the central tenets
and print advertising are poor seconds to
of sound science: full disclosure of underlythe influence they wield. Although these
ing data and no sponsor interference with the
same reforms are necessary in the arena of
design of the study or release of results. As
environmental research, they may prove
with the medical journals, EPA should dismuch harder to accomplish, especially given
close the sponsor of the research for all the
the fundamentally different economic incenkey articles it relies upon for its decisionmak-
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ies funded by entities with a financial stake
ing. Third, EPA must establish a peer review
in the regulatory decisions that the studies
process that eliminates panelists with actual
ostensibly inform, although it should by
or potential conflicts of interest. Given the
rights apply across the board to any piece of
problems reported by the medical journals,
scientific evidence offered for EPA’s considit cannot rely exclusively on peer review by
eration. It is worth noting that the governothers, even peer-reviewed articles that
ment gives agencies specific powers in this
have been published. Fourth, since many
regard for studies that they fund. Office of
scientists are biased in the sense that they
Management and Budget Circular A-110
have strong opinions, peer-review panels
specifies that an agency is entitled to unremust be balanced with regards to scientific
stricted access to grantees’ records related to
view. To achieve the crucial objective of prethe award, including research data. To acventing the domination of peer review by
complish this reform, EPA should require
one or another self-interested constituency,
that authors of studies submitted for its conEPA must conduct expanded recruitment of
sideration sign comprehensive statements reexperts who have no conflicts and represent
garding their funding sources and the limits
a full range of scientific view. Fifth, EPA
imposed by their research contracts. EPA
must reserve for its staff the sensitive task
should publicize the sources of funding for
of writing toxicological profiles and should
each major study it relies upon for its decinever again delegate such work to self-insions.
terested industry scientists. Last, increased
As for the troubled peer-review process,
government funding for basic research
EPA should not recruit candidates with acwould go a long way toward making the
tual or potential conflicts of interest to serve
first five reforms possible.
on SAB advisory committees (including subTo implement the first reform, EPA sciencommittees) or any other panel of scientific
tists should make it their overriding priority
experts convened to proto compile a research agenda
vide EPA with advice. Conbased on such factors as the
flicts of interest should enprevalence of a chemical in
compass any financial incommerce and in the enviSuspending
terest that would impair the
ronment; the seriousness of
individual’s objectivity, inits suspected adverse health
decisions until
cluding such characteristics
or environmental effects;
as stock ownership or emand the state of our ignoscientists
tell
us
ployment by an organizarance of the chemical’s toxicological properties. Once a
exactly what will tion with a direct financial
interest in the outcome of
list of priorities is developed,
happen makes no
the review, such as the
and the expense of further
award of research grants. If
research can be estimated
more sense than
the prohibition on nomimore accurately, the agency
nees with conflicts of interwill be in the position to conforcing people to
est makes it impossible to
vince the executive branch
self-insure or
convene a panel consisting
and affected industries that
of members with sufficient
further research is urgent.
refusing to engage expertise to give EPA the
Ending any consideration
advice it is seeking, the adof studies that breach core
in long-term
ministrator should waive
principles of research ethics
is the easiest reform to
military planning such conflicts in written, individualized determinaimplement, and is most akin
tions subject to public reto the joint policy statement
view. EPA may include canannounced by the world’s
didates with actual or poleading medical journals. Intential bias regarding the issues to be addeed, it is hard to imagine anyone arguing
dressed by the panel, provided that the
the converse of this proposition: namely, that
panel’s overall membership is balanced. In
EPA staff should rely on research findings to
this context, bias should encompass any prerevise regulatory requirements even when
disposition resulting from professional affilithey have never seen the underlying data that
ation, previous work, social relationship, or
supports those conclusions. This principle is
conflict of interest that could influence the
particularly important in the context of stud4 2
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ibility of science over the long run. By cloakcandidate’s views of the information or
ing a decision not to act as a purely scientific
policy alternatives at stake in the panel’s dejudgment, scientists are saddled with the
liberations.
burden of being wrong, of failing to take proAt the moment, candidates for EPA peertective action in the face of what emerges as
review panels and other scientific advisory
a real threat. When the sources of financial
functions are selected from an existing list
support for additional research are obviously
kept by the SAB staff. The agency clearly
self-interested, the public will be left with the
needs to develop a larger pool of scientific
clear impression that science was sold to the
experts qualified to serve on SAB commithighest bidder.
tees and panels. Within legal constraints, the
We cope with uncertainty in all aspects of
administrator should explore ways to commodern human endeavor. The whole concept
pensate scientific experts at the prevailing
of insurance is based on
market rate for their services,
the proposition that we
both to expand the pool of
can try to predict the fucandidates and to eliminate
ture on the basis of facts
the advantage of industryOnly by
about the past, but in the
funded scientists who are able
end are willing to pay a fee
to earn a living doing such
acknowledging
to ameliorate the consework.
quences if we end up
that it is the
among the injured. If we
exceptional case
were certain what the fuhe precautionary
ture would bring, insurprinciple lies at the
where we will
ance would be unnecesheart of the controsary because we could eiversy over the role
have
definitive
ther save funds to address
of science in the
the risk, or make plans to
regulatory state. The prindata can we hope
avoid the risk.
ciple means taking action to
to restore science
Similarly, as the United
prevent harm to human
States becomes the
health or the environment,
to its rightful
world’s dominant peaceeven if the relationship bekeeper, we are constantly
tween the cause and the efplace in
faced with the imperative
fect is not fully established
of predicting the worst
scientifically. As applied, it
environmental
case scenarios that could
can mean taking preventive
decisionmaking
occur in such situations
measures to reduce pollution;
and doing everything posshifting the burden of provsible to ensure both the
ing the safety of polluting acsuccess and the safety of
tivities to those who wish to
our military forces. No public official would
engage in them; or searching for safer alterconsciously decide to absorb more casualties
natives to releasing the pollutant into the enin order to lower the costs of equipping our
vironment. Or, as Governor Whitman put it
troops to cope with such scenarios, although
so well: “The absence of certainty is not an
those precautionary measures often are trigexcuse to do nothing.”
gered by no more than an educated guess by
Some commentators have argued that apexperts.
plication of the precautionary principle is
Like insurance underwriting or defense,
essentially a policy choice, implicitly sugenvironmental regulation needs to encomgesting that scientists leave the room when
pass the best information available at the time
such decisions are made. At the opposite
a decision must be made. Suspending deciend of the spectrum, conservative commensions until scientists tell us exactly what will
tators argue that when science becomes unhappen makes no more sense than forcing
certain, the only alternative is to work
people to self-insure or refusing to engage in
harder to make it better, forestalling regulong-term military planning. Only by aclatory action until a reasonable level of cerknowledging that it is the exceptional case
tainty can be achieved.
where we will have definitive data can we
While both arguments are extreme, the
hope to restore science to its rightful place in
second is transcendent at the moment and is
environmental decisionmaking. •
likely to prove far more harmful to the cred-
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